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Consumers in the United States make billions 
of transactions each year using cash, checks, 
debit cards, and credit cards. Bank and credit 
card accounts provide consumers with liquidity 
to clear and settle these transactions. In return, 
consumers pay a variety of fees, and both explicit 
and implicit interest charges.
The importance of retail banking and credit 
markets to economic activity drives interest in 
many open policy and research questions. Do 
households borrow too much relative to a neo-
classical benchmark (Christopher D. Carroll 
2001)? Why do many households leave a substan-
tial amount of money on the table in managing 
their accounts (Sumit Agarwal et al. 2006; David 
Gross and Nicholas Souleles 2002)? Do firms 
structure pricing to exploit consumer cognitive 
biases or limitations (Stefano DellaVigna and 
Ulrike Malmendier 2004; Xavier Gabaix and 
David Laibson 2006)? How do learning (Sumit 
Agarwal, John Driscoll, and Gabaix 2008) and 
disclosure regulation (Stango and Zinman 2009b) 
interact with consumer decision making and firm 
strategy to determine market outcomes?
This paper examines some threshold ques-
tions that should inform the questions above: 
what do people really pay to use their bank and 
credit card accounts, and which cost components 
are the largest? Of all the costs that people pay, 
which could they easily avoid by making differ-
ent day-to-day choices? And how stable are both 
the level of costs and the share of costs that are 
“avoidable,” for a given person over time?
What Do Consumers Really Pay on Their Checking and Credit 
Card Accounts? Explicit, Implicit, and Avoidable Costs
By Victor Stango and Jonathan Zinman*
To answer these questions, we use novel 
administrative data containing every check-
ing and credit card account transaction made 
by 917 consumers (households) over two years. 
We measure total explicit and implicit costs 
that consumers pay across all of their bank and 
credit card accounts and describe the relative 
importance of each total cost component. We 
then measure the costs that consumers could 
avoid by making different decisions, and mea-
sure how stable costs and avoidable costs are for 
consumers month to month.
Compared to national averages, our sample 
uses electronic payments relatively intensively, 
has typical amounts of revolving debt, and is 
younger, wealthier, more educated, more likely 
to manage finances online, and more creditwor-
thy. In short, our sample is likely to be relatively 
financially sophisticated.
In our sample, the median household pays 
$43 in total bank and credit card account costs 
per month. The twenty-fifth percentile pays $13 
per month, while the seventy-fifth pays $111 per 
month, and the ninetieth percentile pays $257 
($3,084 per year). For most consumers who 
pay economically significant costs, credit card 
interest is the largest component of total costs. 
Many consumers pay checking account fees per 
month that are zero or close to zero, and forgo 
little interest by holding bank account balances. 
There are serial payers of fees: among those with 
nonzero average overdraft fees per month, the 
seventy-fifth percentile is nearly $20 per month. 
Among those who pay some credit card late or 
overlimit fees, the seventy-fifth percentiles are 
$12 and $16 per month. But more than half of 
our panelists never pay penalty fees.
For those who do pay significant fees and 
credit card interest, a large share of costs could 
be avoided relatively easily. At the median, 
almost half of credit card interest could be 
avoided by a combination of reallocating from 
high- to low-rate cards, and repaying debt using 
available checking balances. Among those who 
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overdraft their bank accounts, nearly all could 
have avoided fees by using a much cheaper source 
of liquidity (usually a credit card with available 
credit). Most credit card late and overlimit fees 
could be avoided by either paying a bill using 
available checking balances, or by using a dif-
ferent card with sufficient available credit. In all, 
the median panelist could avoid 60 percent of all 
credit card interest charges, overdraft fees, and 
overlimit and late fees through such behavior. 
Another way to scale avoidable costs is to equate 
them to a “consumption cost”—the additional 
amount one could borrow, without any increase 
in the monthly interest payment, by allocating 
payment choices more efficiently. This consump-
tion cost exceeds $1,000 for most panelists.
For most panelists, the month-to-month level 
of credit card interest costs and the share of 
them that could be avoided are fairly persistent: 
both autocorrelations are around 0.50. Fee costs 
and their avoidability are less strongly autocor-
related, and negatively so for many panelists.
What drives costs, avoidable costs, or their per-
sistence is not something that we try to explain 
in this paper. Precautionary demand, rational 
inattention under bounded rationality, mental 
accounting, and shrouded attributes are among 
the leading potential explanations we explore in 
Stango and Zinman (2009a). Here we take the 
first step of establishing some stylized facts.
I. The Data
Our data come from Lightspeed Research 
(formerly Forrester Research) in 2006 and 2007 
as part of its comprehensive consumer panel. 
Panelists have typically participated in other 
Lightspeed surveys and enter the sample by pro-
viding Lightspeed with access to online bank 
(checking, savings, or time deposit) and credit 
card accounts held by their household. The pri-
mary pieces of the dataset are monthly state-
ment data “pulled” from each account, daily 
transaction information “scraped” from each 
account’s transaction listing page, and account 
information scraped periodically from other 
account pages (such as the one listing “terms”). 
A second important piece of data is registra-
tion information collected when the consumer 
enrolls in the panel. That data includes some 
standard demographics (income, education, 
etc.), self-reports on account holding and use, 
and some credit bureau data.
To enroll in the panel, a household must reg-
ister at least two accounts of any type, but can 
register many more. Because the registration 
information also includes the panelist’s active 
deposit and credit card accounts, we can con-
struct a subsample of panelists registering the 
full set of checking and credit card accounts 
held by their household.1 Below we report results 
for 917 panelists who meet the full-set criterion, 
register at least one deposit and one credit card 
account (which may be at different banks), and 
are in the sample for nine months or more.
Observing the full set of accounts is criti-
cal for estimating avoidable costs, because 
avoidability is a function of other options. The 
Lightspeed data have several advantages over 
other datasets that might be used to study high-
frequency transaction and borrowing behavior. 
Administrative data from a single financial 
institution typically lacks the customer’s full 
choice set and much of the supplemental data we 
observe from Lightspeed’s surveys. More stan-
dard household surveys (such as the Survey of 
Consumer Finances) lack comprehensive high-
frequency financial information, and may suffer 
from reporting biases (Zinman, forthcoming).
The main disadvantage of the Lightspeed data 
is that they are not nationally representative. 
The requirement that panelists register accounts 
online selects younger and relatively educated 
people, who therefore have high income con-
ditional on age. Panelists are necessarily those 
who are willing to share sensitive financial 
information (in exchange for the compensation 
they get for participating), although household 
surveys on consumer finances face this selection 
issue as well. (Stango and Zinman (2009a) dis-
cuss representativeness issues in greater detail.)
An observation in the raw data is a panelist-
transaction. We define “transaction” as anything 
that changes an account balance. So retail pur-
chases are transactions, as are finance charges and 
fees. For each transaction, we observe transac-
tion-level characteristics (including the date and 
dollar amount), the account on which the transac-
tion is made, the panelist making the transaction 
and her (largely time-invariant) demographic 
1 We can impose the full-set filter using either self-
reported account counts from the registration survey or 
active line data from the credit bureau file. Both have their 
advantages and disadvantages. Here we report results using 
the registration survey as the filter.
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characteristics, time-varying account charac-
teristics such as running balance and available 
liquidity, running balances and liquidity on all 
other accounts held by that panelist, and account 
characteristics that change at much lower fre-
quencies such as interest rates and credit limits.
We have 917 panelists registering the full set 
of checking and credit card accounts, and 13,060 
panelist-months for an average of 14 months 
per panelist. These panelists display 722,944 
transactions on all of their accounts, of which 
416,994 are on deposit accounts and 305,950 
are on credit card accounts. Their debit/credit 
transaction split is similar to the US average. 
The age distribution is skewed toward younger 
consumers, although income conditional on age 
is higher than the national average. Education 
levels are relatively high as well. Average cred-
itworthiness is comparable to the national aver-
age, but above average conditional on age.
The average number of checking accounts per 
panelist is just over two, and the average number 
of credit cards is just over four. Panelists aver-
age one “spending” transaction (an accounting 
debit) per day, although many make more than 
that. Debit and credit card transactions are the 
most common type. Other “electronic” transac-
tions (including discretionary and automatic pay-
ments) are also fairly common. Our subsample 
appears to be less cash-intensive than the popu-
lation at large, as judged by their ATM usage.
Most consumers concentrate their card pur-
chases almost exclusively on either debit or 
credit, particularly over shorter intervals, e.g., 
very few mix card types within a month. By 
most measures, our panelists have access to sub-
stantial liquidity, either in the form of checking 
balances or available credit. The median daily 
available checking balance is $1,194, and the 
median daily available credit on all cards is 
$9,787. Despite carrying high credit card bal-
ances, many consumers rarely revolve (borrow) 
on their credit cards; the median daily credit card 
balance is $2,629, but the median daily revolv-
ing balance is $666. At the high end (ninetieth 
percentile), daily revolving credit card balances 
are close to $20,000.
II. What Consumers Pay:  
Explicit and Implicit Costs
Many costs to consumers are explicit and 
captured directly from a particular transaction. 
On credit card accounts these include inter-
est charges, annual or monthly fees, late and 
overlimit fees, cash advance fees, and balance 
transfer fees. On deposit accounts these include 
monthly account fees, overdraft fees, ATM fees, 
transfer fees, and other fees (e.g., for cashier 
checks).
We also measure the implicit (“forgone”) 
interest that consumers pay by leaving funds 
in deposit accounts, which most often pay 
zero interest. We assume that the alternative 
is a daily sweep of deposit account funds into 
a risk-free investment paying the contempo-
raneous three-month Treasury Bill rate. For 
each panelist we multiply total checking bal-
ances by the risk-free rate to get foregone daily 
interest; we exclude savings, CD, and MMDA 
account balances from that calculation as they 
already earn interest. We reduce the base on 
which daily interest foregone is calculated by 
the amount of revolving credit card debt; in that 
case, the explicit interest payments on revolving 
debt measure the (opportunity) cost of holding 
checking balances.
Credit card users who do not have revolv-
ing debt earn implicit interest (“float”) on their 
credit card charges. We again calculate this day 
by day, using the three-month T-Bill rate to infer 
a daily risk-free return.
Summing explicit costs and net implicit costs 
yields estimates of the full gross, pecuniary 
costs borne by consumers for transaction ser-
vices and liquidity. We emphasize that we are 
simply measuring gross pecuniary costs, not net 
benefits in monetized or utility terms. We there-
fore ignore time and other nonpecuniary costs, 
and we also ignore the benefits provided by the 
transaction and liquidity services (including risk 
mitigation).
Table 1 shows information about the distri-
bution of average total monthly costs (“total 
costs”) at the panelist level, and decomposes 
those costs. One striking feature of total costs 
and its components is the great degree of het-
erogeneity. The interquartile range of total costs 
is [$13.41, $110.71]. The seventy-fifth percentile 
pays about 2 percent of pretax household income 
for the liquidity provided by its checking and 
credit card accounts.
Eighty-five percent of our panelists pay some 
explicit credit card cost during our sample 
period. The largest explicit cost is typically 
credit card interest. Credit card penalty fees (late 
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and overlimit) are also important; 48  percent of 
our  panelists pay at least one, and many incur 
penalties that average more than $10 per month. 
Annual fees and cash advance fees are not prev-
alent in our data.
Explicit checking account fees are far less 
important, except for the 32 percent of panelists 
who pay at least one overdraft fee. Among these 
consumers, the interquartile range of average 
monthly overdraft fees is [$3.24, $18.48].
Table 1—Average Monthly Costs of Deposit and Credit Card Accounts
Percentiles among those with nonzero values
Variable
Share of panelists 
w/zero 25th 50th 75th 90th
Explicit, credit card: 0.15 10.41 37.16 115.14 246.94
 Interest paid 0.18 6.67 29.91 102.32 238.72
 Late fees 0.55 3.22 4.89 11.70 26.00
 Overlimit fees 0.78 3.55 8.28 16.31 26.71
 Cash advance fees 0.94 0.56 1.91 4.50 9.44
 Annual fees 0.70 3.26 5.91 10.33 16.67
 Other fees 0.91 3.00 4.90 9.90 12.81
Explicit, checking account: 0.31 1.10 4.83 14.75 36.31
 Overdraft fees 0.68 3.24 7.33 18.48 42.78
 ATM fees 0.56 0.22 0.55 1.50 3.98
 Other fees 0.51 0.75 2.18 6.30 14.78
Implicit:
 Credit card float earned 0.14 −0.75 −2.91 −8.26 −16.44
 Checking interest forgone 0.13 0.41 2.17 8.52 25.96
Total costs: 0.00 13.41 42.65 110.71 256.58
 Credit card 0.00 −0.29 21.39 89.20 226.30
 Checking account 0.03 2.91 8.71 21.79 45.60
 Explicit 0.07 11.10 41.98 120.43 265.60
 Implicit 0.04 −2.83 0.01 3.58 14.93
 All interest 0.00 6.73 24.26 76.16 211.25
 Total fees 0.15 3.88 11.44 29.50 68.72
Share costs avoidable: 0.00 0.33 0.60 0.98 1.00
 Interest paid 0.00 0.28 0.52 0.93 1.00
 Late fees 0.04 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00
 Overlimit fees 0.15 0.00 0.75 1.00 1.00
 Overdraft fees 0.03 0.00 0.62 1.00 1.00
Month-to-month correlation within panelist:
 All costs 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.56 0.74
 All fees 0.15 −0.14 −0.06 0.24 0.50
 All interest 0.00 0.17 0.45 0.67 0.83
 Share costs avoidable 0.00 −0.04 0.23 0.53 0.77
 Share fees avoidable 0.15 −0.28 0.00 0.58 0.80
 Share interest avoidable 0.00 0.21 0.49 0.71 0.85
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, cells contain per-month average dollar values across the 917 panelists in the subsample. 
“Other” fees on credit card accounts include phone transaction fees and other miscellaneous fees. “Other” fees on checking 
accounts include monthly account fees, safe deposit box fees, cashier/bank check fees, and other miscellaneous fees. Credit 
card float earned is calculated as total credit card debt minus revolving credit card debt times the daily risk-free (three-month 
T-Bill) interest rate, summed over the month and averaged across months. Checking balance interest forgone is calculated 
using the daily excess of checking balances over revolving credit card debt, and is treated as costing the risk-free rate. For 
“share costs avoidable,” five cost components are in the denominator: explicit credit card interest, checking interest forgone, 
late fees, overlimit fees, and overdraft fees. The numerator includes the level of those costs that the panelist could avoid in 
the following ways. Explicit credit card interest is avoidable via repayment from checking balances or reallocating debt from 
high-rate to low-rate cards. Checking interest forgone is avoidable via a daily sweep into an account earning the risk-free rate. 
Late fees are avoidable if available checking balances exceeded the minimum monthly payment for every day during the bill-
ing period. Overlimit fees are avoidable if the amount over limit was available in checking or on another card during every 
day of the billing period. Overdraft fees are avoidable if available liquidity exists on another card (checking or credit).
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Implicit interest is not a big benefit or cost at 
the median. But, again, the breadth of the dis-
tribution is noteworthy: many panelists earn 
substantial amounts on credit card float, and/
or forgo substantial interest by holding large 
checking balances.
III. Avoidable Costs: Choices at the Point of Sale 
and Reallocation of Funds
In principle, nearly all of the costs described 
above are avoidable if consumers make different 
long-run decisions (e.g., to reduce consumption 
in order to repay credit card debt).
Here we examine narrower questions: what 
share of these costs could be avoided, condi-
tional on the set of purchase transactions and 
the payment choice set? What share of costs 
might be avoided simply by using the lowest-
cost payment method? A related question is 
how much consumers could save by reallocat-
ing dollars from high-cost accounts to low-cost 
accounts.
For checking accounts, any implicit interest 
costs could be avoided by costlessly sweeping 
funds into an interest-bearing account or pay-
ing down high-interest credit. That is an aggres-
sive assumption, but given interest in household 
“borrowing high and lending low,” it is infor-
mative as an upper bound on avoidable costs 
(Zinman 2007).
We also classify some overdraft fees as 
avoidable. If a consumer overdrafts but holds 
sufficient available funds in another checking 
account, or sufficient available credit on a credit 
card, we measure that fee as avoidable. For the 
time being, we ignore the cost of using the alter-
native payment method (e.g., the interest cost of 
charging instead of bouncing a check). In most 
cases those costs are less than a dollar (versus 
$25 for overdrafting).
On credit card accounts, we classify inter-
est charges as avoidable if revolving balances 
could be repaid using available checking funds. 
We make that calculation day by day. We also 
classify interest charges as avoidable if revolv-
ing balances could be shifted onto lower-rate 
credit cards already held by the panelist (this 
could have been done ex ante, by choosing a 
different card at the point-of-sale, or ex post, by 
allocating payments to more expensive cards). 
That calculation is also day by day. For now, we 
assume that the consumer faces no credit limit 
at the lowest available credit card interest rate; 
we will relax that assumption in future work.
Some credit card fees are avoidable too. Late 
fees are avoidable if the panelist’s minimum 
available checking balance during the billing 
period exceeds the minimum payment on the 
credit card (i.e., on this component we err on the 
side of classifying more fees as unavoidable). 
Overlimit fees are avoidable if the transaction 
that generated the overlimit fee could have been 
made using a debit card or another credit card. 
Cash advance fees are avoidable if the value of 
the advance is less than the panelist’s minimum 
checking account balance during the month 
(again, we err on the side of classifying more 
fees as unavoidable).
Table 1 contains some estimates of avoidable 
costs. The top row shows that in the median 
panelist-month, 60 percent of costs could be 
avoided. At the seventy-fifth percentile nearly 
all costs could be avoided. Interest paid is less 
avoidable by our metrics than penalty fees, 
nearly all of which appear to be avoidable. 
These results are striking for at least two rea-
sons. First, our measure of avoidable interest 
costs is on the high side (i.e., closer to an upper 
bound), and our measure of avoidable penalty 
fees is on the low side (i.e., closer to a lower 
bound). This strengthens the inference that most 
penalty fees are avoidable with small changes in 
short-run behavior, while most interest charges 
are not. Second, recall that we likely have a rela-
tively financially sophisticated sample. If avoid-
able penalty fees are prominent in this sample, 
they may be even more prominent in the general 
population.
IV. Persistence of Costs at the Panelist Level
The last part of Table 1 reports the average 
within-panelist month-to-month correlation in 
costs and avoidable costs. Again there is a wide 
range of heterogeneity in the persistence of total 
costs and its components. The interquartile range 
of total costs persistence is [0.01, 0.56], with a 
median of 0.29. Interest and avoidable interest 
are fairly persistent, penalty fees are not gener-
ally persistent. Perhaps most interestingly, there 
is great heterogeneity in the (lack of) persistence 
in avoidable fees. Many consumers pay nearly 
the same avoidable amount every month, e.g., 
the ninetieth percentile of those with nonzero 
fees is a month-to-month correlation of 0.8. But 
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many other consumers show little persistence: 
the median correlation is zero, which means that 
month-to-month avoidable fees are negatively 
correlated for nearly half of our panelists.
V. Conclusion
We present several new stylized facts on what 
people actually pay to use their checking and 
credit card accounts. Our median household 
pays $500 per year and could avoid more than 
half these costs with minor changes in behavior. 
Translating these avoidable costs into consump-
tion terms, we find that most consumers could 
afford to borrow more than 1,000 additional 
dollars simply by allocating payment choices 
more efficiently. Penalty fees are economi-
cally important (representing about half of total 
fees, and the lion’s share of checking account 
costs), and most penalty fees are easily avoid-
able by our metrics. Interest and avoidable inter-
est generally persist over time; in contrast, fee 
and avoidable fee costs are negatively correlated 
over time for many consumers. On all margins 
of costs and cost persistence, we find tremen-
dous heterogeneity.
We leave the many questions about what 
drives these outcomes for future research in 
consumer choice, strategic pricing, and equilib-
rium household finance.
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